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Abstract Linear logic can be used as a meta-logic to specify a range of object-level
proof systems. In particular, we show that by providing different polarizations within a
focused proof system for linear logic, one can account for natural deduction (normal and
non-normal), sequent proofs (with and without cut), and tableaux proofs. Armed with
just a few, simple variations to the linear logic encodings, more proof systems can be
accommodated, including proof system using generalized elimination and generalized
introduction rules. In general, most of these proof systems are developed for both
classical and intuitionistic logics. By using simple results about linear logic, we can
also give simple and modular proofs of the soundness and relative completeness of all
the proof systems we consider.
1 Introduction
Logics and type systems have been exploited in recent years as frameworks for the
specification of deduction in a number of logics. The most common such meta-logics
and logical frameworks have been based on intuitionistic logic (see, for example, [Felty
and Miller, 1988, Paulson, 1989]) or dependent types (see [Harper et al., 1993, Pfenning,
1989]). Such intuitionistic logics can be used to directly encode natural deduction style
proof systems.
In the series of papers [Miller, 1996, Pimentel, 2001, Miller and Pimentel, 2002,
2004, Pimentel and Miller, 2005], classical linear logic was used as a meta-logic to
specify and reason about a variety of sequent calculus proof systems. Since the en-
codings of such logical systems are natural and direct, the meta-theory of linear logic
can be used to draw conclusions about the object-level proof systems. For example, in
[Miller and Pimentel, 2002], a decision procedure was presented for determining if one
encoded proof system is derivable from another. In the same paper, necessary condi-
tions were presented (together with a decision procedure) for assuring that an encoded
proof system satisfies cut-elimination. This last result used linear logic’s dualities to
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formalize the fact that if the left and right introduction rules are suitable duals of each
other then non-atomic cuts can be eliminated.
In this paper, we again use linear logic as a meta-logic but make critical use of
the completeness of focused proofs for linear logic. Roughly speaking, focused proofs
in linear logic divide cut-free, sequent calculus proofs into two different phases: the
negative phase involves rules that are invertible while the positive phase involves the
focused application of dual rules. In linear logic, it is clear to which phase each linear
logic connective appears but it is completely arbitrary how atomic formulas can be
assigned to these different phases. For example, all atomic formulas can be assigned a
negative polarity or a positive polarity or, in fact, atomic formulas can be split with some
being positive and the rest negative. The completeness of focused proofs then states
that if a formula B is provable in linear logic and we fix on any polarity assignment to
atomic formulas, then B will have a focused proof. Thus, while polarity assignment does
not affect provability, it can result in strikingly different proofs. The earlier works of
Miller & Pimentel assumed that all atoms were given negative polarity: this assignment
resulted in an encoding of object-level sequent calculus. As we shall show here, if we
vary that polarity assignment, we can get other object-level proof systems represented.
Thus, while provability is not affected, different meta-level focused proofs are built and
these encode different object-level proof systems.
Our main contribution in this paper is illustrating how a range of proof systems
can be seen as different focusing disciplines on the same or (meta-logically) equivalent
sets of linear logic specifications. Soundness and relative completeness of the encoded
proof systems are generally derived via simple arguments about the structure of linear
logic proofs. In particular, we present examples based on sequent calculus and natural
deduction [Gentzen, 1969], Generalized Elimination Rules [von Plato, 2001], Free De-
duction [Parigot, 1992], the tableaux system KE [D’Agostino and Mondadori, 1994],
and Smullyan’s Analytic Cut [Smullyan, 1968b]. The adequacy of a given specification
of inference rules requires first assigning polarity to meta-level atoms used in the speci-
fication: then adequacy is generally an immediate consequence of the focusing theorem
of linear logic.
Comparing two proof systems can be done at three different levels of “adequacy”:
relative completeness claims simply that the provable sets of formulas are the same,
full completeness of proofs claims that the completed proofs are in one-to-one corre-
spondence, and full completeness of derivations claims that (open) derivations (such as
inference rules themselves) are also in one-to-one correspondence. All the proof systems
that we shall encode will be done with this third, most refined level of adequacy.
This paper is an extended and improved version of the conference paper [Nigam
and Miller, 2008a].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 A focusing proof system for linear logic
We shall assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of linear logic: we review
a few specific points of the logic here. A literal is either an atomic formula or the
negation of an atomic formula. A formula is in negation normal form if negations have
only atomic scope: the negation normal form of a formula is computed by using the
de Morgan dualities to move negations deeper into formulas. If F is a linear logic
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formula, then we write ¬F to denote the negation normal form of the negation of F .
The connectives ⊗ and O and their units 1 and ⊥ are multiplicative; the connectives ⊕
and & and their units 0 and ⊤ are additive; ∀ and ∃ are quantifiers; and the operators
! and ? are the exponentials.
In general, we shall present theories in the linear meta-logic as appearing on the
right-hand side of sequents. Thus, if X is a set of closed formulas then we say that the
formula B is derived using theory X if ⊢ B,X is provable in linear logic. We shall also
write B ≡ C to denote the formula (¬B O C) & (¬C O B).
Andreoli [1992] proved the completeness of the focused proof system for linear
logic given in Figure 1. Focusing proof systems involve applying inference rules in
alternating polarities or phases. In particular, formulas are negative if their top-level
connective is either O,⊥,&,⊤, ?, or ∀; formulas are positive if their top-level connective
is ⊕, 0,⊗, 1, !, or ∃. This polarity assignment is rather natural in the sense that all right
introduction rules for negative formulas are invertible while such introduction rules for
positive formulas are not necessarily invertible. Atomic formulas must also belong to
a phase, but here they are assigned to the positive or negative phase arbitrarily. The
polarity of a negated atom is, of course, the flip of the atom’s polarity. There are two
kinds of sequents in the focused proof system, namely ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L and ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F ,
where Θ, Γ , and L are multisets of formulas and F is a formula. In the negative phase,
represented by the judgment ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L, rules are applied only to negative formulas
appearing in L, while positive formulas are moved to one of the multisets, Θ or Γ , on
the left of the ⇑, by using the [R ⇑] or [?] rules. (We usually describe the dynamics of
an inference rule by reading their effects on sequents when moving from the conclusion
to the premises.) When L is empty, the positive phase begins by using one of the
decide rules [D1] or [D2] to select a single formula on which to “focus”: the judgment
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F denotes such a sequent which is focused on F . Rules are then applied
hereditarily to subformulas of F until a negative subformula is encountered, at which
time, the reaction rule [R ⇓] is used and another negative phase begins. We often refer
to the context Θ as the unbounded context and the context Γ as the linear or bounded
context.
We write ⊢llf Θ : Γ ⇑ to indicate that the sequent ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ has a proof in LLF;
⊢llf Θ : Γ ⇓ to indicate that the sequent ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ has a proof in LLF; and ⊢ll Γ to
indicate that the sequent ⊢ Γ is provable in linear logic [Girard, 1987]. The following
proposition can be proved by a simple induction on the structure of focused proofs.
Proposition 1 Let Θ, Γ , and ∆ be multisets of formulas and let L be a list of formulas
and F a formula. If ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L has a proof then ⊢ Θ,∆ : Γ ⇑ L has a proof of the
same height. If ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F has a proof then ⊢ Θ,∆ : Γ ⇓ F has a proof of the same
height.
The two-phase structure of LLF proofs allows us to collect introduction rules into
“macro-rules” that can be seen as introducing “synthetic connectives.” For example, if
the formulas A1, A2, A3 are negative formulas then we can view the positive formula
A1 ⊕ (A2 ⊗A3) as a synthetic connective with the following two “macro-rule”:
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ A1
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ A1 ⊕ (A2 ⊗A3)
⊢ Θ : Γ1 ⇑ A2 ⊢ Θ : Γ2 ⇑ A3
⊢ Θ : Γ1, Γ2 ⇓ A1 ⊕ (A2 ⊗A3)
That is, within the LLF proof system, there are only these two ways to focus on this
formula and there is no possibility to interleave other introduction rules (“micro-rules”)
with those that comprise these two macro rules.
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Introduction Rules
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,⊥
[⊥]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,F,G
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,F O G
[O]
⊢ Θ,F : Γ ⇑ L
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L, ?F
[?]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,⊤
[⊤]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,F ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,G
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,F &G
[&]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,F [c/x]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L,∀xF
[∀]
⊢ Θ :⇓ 1
[1]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F ⊢ Θ : Γ ′ ⇓ G
⊢ Θ : Γ, Γ ′ ⇓ F ⊗G
[⊗]
⊢ Θ :⇑ F
⊢ Θ :⇓ !F
[!]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F ⊕G
[⊕l]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ G
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F ⊕G
[⊕r]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ F [t/x]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ ∃xF
[∃]
Identity, Reaction, and Decide rules
⊢ Θ : A⊥p ⇓ Ap
[I1]
⊢ Θ,A⊥p :⇓ Ap
[I2]
⊢ Θ : Γ, S ⇑ L
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L, S
[R ⇑]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ P
⊢ Θ : Γ, P ⇑
[D1]
⊢ Θ,P : Γ ⇓ P
⊢ Θ,P : Γ ⇑
[D2]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ N
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ N
[R ⇓]
Fig. 1 The focused proof system, LLF, for linear logic [Andreoli, 1992]. Here, L is a list of
formulas, Θ is a multiset of formulas, Γ is a multiset of literals and positive formulas, Ap is a
positive literal, N is a negative formula, P is not a negative literal, and S is a positive formula
or a negated atom.
The role of atoms and their polarity plays a special role in this paper. A simple
consequence of Andreoli’s completeness theorem in [Andreoli, 1992] is that, for any
assignment of polarities to atoms, a formula F is provable in LLF if and only if it is
provable in linear logic. Although the polarity assignment of literals does not affect
provability, it does affect what synthetic connectives are available and, therefore, the
shape and size of focused proofs. The polarity of atoms affects the structure of proofs
because the rules [I1] and [I2] explicitly refer to the polarity assigned to literals. Con-
sider, for example, focusing on the positive formula A⊥ ⊗ N where formula N and
atom A are both negative: this leads to the construction of two macro-rules for this
synthetic connective
⊢ Θ,A : · ⇓ A⊥
[I1]
⊢ Θ,A : Γ ⇑ N
⊢ Θ,A : Γ ⇓ N
[R ⇓]
⊢ Θ,A : Γ ⇓ A⊥ ⊗N
[⊗]
⊢ Θ : A ⇓ A⊥
[I2]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ N
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ N
[R ⇓]
⊢ Θ : Γ,A ⇓ A⊥ ⊗N
[⊗]
Thus, in order for focusing on the formula A⊥ ⊗N to yield a successful derivation, it
must be the case that the formula A is present in either the unbounded or bounded
context. On the other hand, if the atom A is assigned the positive polarity then the
synthetic connective of A⊥ ⊗N is introduced by a derivation of the form:
⊢ Θ : Γ1 ⇑ A
⊥
⊢ Θ : Γ1 ⇓ A
⊥
[R ⇓] ⊢ Θ : Γ2 ⇑ N
⊢ Θ : Γ2 ⇓ N
[R ⇓]
⊢ Θ : Γ1, Γ2 ⇓ A
⊥ ⊗N
[⊗]
Here, there is no restriction imposed on A occurring in either the bounded or unbounded
contexts.
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An interesting and important questions to ask is: how should one assign polarity to
atoms. Although the choice will not affect the provability of a formula, the choice has
a major impact on the structure of (focused) proofs. The earliest connections between
polarity and proofs appeared in linear logic programming languages. In particular,
giving all atoms a negative polarity caused focused proofs to describe goal-directed (top-
down) proofs [Hodas and Miller, 1994, Miller, 1996]. Chaudhuri et al. [2008] showed
that in the simple setting of Horn clauses, the difference between SLD-resolution and
hyperresolution could be explained by two different assignments of polarity to atoms.
Besides Andreoli’s LLF, there have been a number of other proof systems for intu-
itionistic and classical logic that are also focused: for example, uniform proof systems
[Miller et al., 1991], LJQ [Danos et al., 1995, Dyckhoff and Lengrand, 2006], and LJT
[Danos et al., 1995]. In these systems, all atoms are assigned the same polarity. By
allowing mixed, and even changing polarity assignments to atoms, it is possible to
captured tabled deduction as focused proofs search [Miller and Nigam, 2007].
Notice that polarity assignment of atoms in focusing systems is completely inde-
pendent from the notion of positive and negative occurrences of atoms in formulas. The
former is a global (arbitrary) assignment and the latter is defined according to the po-
sition of the atom in a formula: an occurrence is positive (respectively negative) if the
atom is under an even (respectively odd) number of implications. For instance, given
a polarity assignment, all occurrences, positive and negative, of an atom are assigned
with the same polarity.
Besides the choice of polarity assignments to atoms, the exponentials, ? and !, also
play an important role in shaping the search for proofs. In particular, in a focused linear
logic sequents, such as ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ L, the formulas in Θ have (implicitly) a ? as their
top-level connective. Formulas in Θ can be contracted and weaken arbitrarily while
formulas in Γ can be neither weaken nor contracted. Our encoding of intuitionistic
logic will place formulas in both of these contexts. Dually, the ! plays the role of
ensuring that the bounded context is empty. Consider, for example, a sequent focused
on the formula ?F ⊗ !G. This sequent must be introduced by a derivation of the form:
⊢ Θ,F : Γ ⇑
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ ?F
[?]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ ?F
[R ⇓]
⊢ Θ : · ⇑ G
⊢ Θ : · ⇓ !G
[!]
⊢ Θ : Γ ⇓ ?F ⊗ !G
[⊗]
The introduction rule for ! requires that the entire bounded context, Γ , is forced to
the left-branch. Moreover, because of the ?, the formula F is moved to the unbounded
context. There is no choice in how focus proof construction is organized once this
compound formula has been selected.
2.2 Encoding object-logic formulas and proof contexts
We shall assume that our meta-logic is a multi-sorted version of linear logic that results
from imposing on linear logic Church’s approach to representing terms and formulas
as simply typed λ-terms [Church, 1940]. In particular, we use the type o for the type of
meta-level formulas, the type form for object-level formulas, and the type i for object-
level terms. The object-level quantifiers ∀ and ∃ are given the type (i→ form)→ form
and the expressions ∀(λx.B) and ∃(λx.B) are written, respectively, as ∀x.B and ∃x.B.
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(⇒L) ⌊A⇒ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋) (⇒R) ⌈A⇒ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉)
(∧L) ⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋ ⊕ ⌊B⌋) (∧R) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉& ⌈B⌉)
(∨L) ⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋& ⌊B⌋) (∨R) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊕ ⌈B⌉)
(∀L) ⌊∀B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ⌊Bx⌋ (∀R) ⌈∀B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ∀x⌈Bx⌉
(∃L) ⌊∃B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ∀x⌊Bx⌋ (∃R) ⌈∃B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌈Bx⌉
(⊥L) ⌊⊥⌋
⊥ (tR) ⌈t⌉
⊥ ⊗⊤
Fig. 2 The theory L used to encode various proof systems for minimal, intuitionistic, and
classical logics.
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2) ⌊B⌋ ⊗ ⌈B⌉ (Id2′) ⌊B⌋ ⊗ !⌈B⌉
(StrL) ⌊B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋ (StrR) ⌈B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ?⌈B⌉ (WR) ⌈C⌉
⊥ ⊗⊥
Fig. 3 Specification of the identity rules (cut and initial) and of the structural rules (weakening
and contraction).
To deal with quantified object-level formulas, our meta-logic will quantify over variables
of types i→ · · · → i→ form (for 0 or more occurrences of i).
The proof systems that we encode have partial proofs that involve formulas in two
senses. For example, in the process of building a natural deduction proof, some formulas
are hypotheses (one argues from such formulas) and some formulas are conclusions (one
argues to such formulas). In the process of building a sequent calculus proofs, some
formulas are on the left of the sequent arrow and some are on the right. Tableaux
proofs similarly use signed formulas (with either a T or F sign [Smullyan, 1968a]) or
place formulas on the left or right of a turnstile [D’Agostino and Mondadori, 1994].
Informally, we will think of a proof context as being a collection of object-level
formulas that are each present in these two senses. Thus, when encoding natural de-
duction, this collection can be a set or a multiset of object-level formulas marked as
either being an hypothesis or the conclusion. In order to provide a consistent pre-
sentation of proof contexts throughout the range of proof systems, we introduce the
two meta-level predicates ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ of type form → o: the meta-level atomic for-
mulas ⌊B⌋ and ⌈B⌉ are then used to denote these two different senses of how the
object-level formula B is used within a proof context1. The meta-level focused se-
quent ⊢ Θ : Γ ⇑ can then be used to collect together atomic formulas into a set
via the unbounded context Θ or into a multiset via the bounded context Γ . Thus,
the object-level sequent B1, . . . , Bn ⊢ C1, . . . , Cm can be encoded as the LLF sequent
⊢ · : ⌊B1⌋, . . . , ⌊Bn⌋, ⌈C1⌉, . . . , ⌈Cm⌉ ⇑ if both the left and right side of the object-level
sequent are multisets. If, say, the left side is a set and the right side is a multiset,
then this sequent could be represented as ⊢ ⌊B1⌋, . . . , ⌊Bn⌋ : ⌈C1⌉, . . . , ⌈Cm⌉ ⇑. Here,
formulas on the left of the object-level sequent are marked using ⌊·⌋ and formulas on
the right of the object-level sequent are marked using ⌈·⌉. For convenience, if Γ is a
(multi)set of formulas, ⌊Γ ⌋ (resp. ⌈Γ ⌉) denotes the multiset of atoms {⌊F ⌋ | F ∈ Γ}
(resp. {⌈F ⌉ | F ∈ Γ}).
The theory L given in Figure 2 will be used throughout this paper in order to
axiomatize the two senses for all the connectives in both intuitionistic and classical
logic. For example, the conjunction connective appears in two formulas: once in the
scope of ⌊·⌋ and once in the scope of ⌈·⌉. When we display formulas in this manner,
we intend that the named formula is actually the result of applying ? to the existential
1 An easy way to remember which meta-level predicate is used for which object-logic context
is by noticing that ⌊ resembles an L (for left) and ⌈ a R (for right).
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closure of the formula. Thus, the formula named (∧L) is actually ?∃A∃B[⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗
(⌊A⌋ ⊕ ⌊B⌋)]. Notice that this axiomization is independent of the proof systems that
this theory is used to describe and that, in all clauses, no side-formulas are mentioned:
that is, the only object-logic formulas involved are subformulas of the formula whose
main connective is explained. Furthermore, for intuitionistic and minimal logics, we
use, instead, the two following formulas for the meaning of implication:
(⊃L) ⌊A ⊃ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋) (⊃R) ⌈A ⊃ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉).
While the formula (⊃R) is very similar to the formula (⇒R), the formula (⊃L) differs
from the formula (⇒L), as the former contains a bang which will be important to
correctly encode the structural restriction for intuitionistic and minimal logics, where
sequents contain at most one formula in their right-hand-side. We denote by LJ the
set obtained from L by replacing the formulas (⇒L) and (⇒R) by (⊃L) and (⊃R),
and we denote by LM the set obtained by removing the formula (⊥L) from LJ .
The formulas in Figure 3 also play a central role in presenting proof systems. The
Id1 and Id2 formulas can prove the duality of the ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ predicates: in particular,
one can prove in linear logic that
⊢ ∀B(⌈B⌉ ≡ ⌊B⌋⊥) & ∀B(⌊B⌋ ≡ ⌈B⌉⊥), Id1, Id2.
These two formulas are used, for example, to encode the initial and cut rules when we
shall encode object-level sequent calculi (Section 3). To correctly encode the structural
restrictions of intuitionistic and minimal logics, we use the clause Id2
′, instead of Id2.
The formulas StrL and StrR allow us to prove the equivalences ⌊B⌋ ≡ ?⌊B⌋ and ⌈B⌉ ≡
?⌈B⌉. The last two equivalences allows the weakening and contraction of formulas at
both the meta-level and object-level. For instance, in the encoding of minimal logics,
where structural rules are only allowed in the left-hand-side, one should include only
the StrL formula; while in the encoding of classical logics, where structural rules are
allowed in both sides of a sequent, one should include both StrL and StrR formulas.
The formula WR encodes the weakening right rule and is used to encode intuitionistic
logics, where weakening, but not contraction, is allowed on formulas on the right-hand-
side of a sequent.
From the StrL clause we can derive the equivalence ⌊B⌋
⊥ ≡ !⌊B⌋⊥ by negating the
equivalence ⌊B⌋ ≡ ?⌊B⌋ obtained from this clause. This equivalence allows us to insert
the ! before negative occurrences of ⌊·⌋. The presence of bangs in theories will play
an important role in encoding correctly the structural rules of logics, such as minimal
and intuitionistic logics, which require that right-hand-sides of sequents do not contain
more than one formula. Although these equivalences do not affect provability, applying
them can change focusing behavior significantly.
The clause WR illustrates how the linearity of formulas in linear logic can be used
to specify structural rules of proof systems. Although in this paper we use mostly the
exponentials to capture these type of rules, one could consider adding clauses that
capture explicitly weakening, as done with the clause WR, and contraction, by using
clauses of the form ∃B[⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌊B⌋ O ⌊B⌋)]. The macro-rule that corresponds to
focusing on this formula will consume an occurrence of ⌊B⌋ in the conclusion and
replace it with two copies in the premise sequent.
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2.3 Adequacy levels for encodings
When comparing deductive systems, one can easily identify several “levels of adequacy.”
For example, Girard in [Girard, 2006, Chapter 7] proposes three levels of adequacy
based on semantical notions: the level of truth, the level of functions, and the level of
actions. Here, we also identify three levels of adequacy but from a proof-theoretical
point-of-view. The weakest level of adequacy is relative completeness which considers
only provability: a formula has a proof in one system if it has a proof in another
system. A stronger level of adequacy is of full completeness of proofs: the proofs of a
given formula are in one-to-one correspondence with proofs in another system. If one
uses the term “derivation” for possibly incomplete proofs (proofs that may have open
premises), we can consider a even stronger level of adequacy. We use the term full
completeness of derivations if the derivations (such as inference rules themselves) in
one system are in one-to-one correspondence with those in another system.
For each of the object-logic proof systems that we consider here, we propose a
meta-level theory, say L′, that can be used to encode that system at the strongest level
of adequacy. In all cases, we obtain L′ from the formulas in Figures 2 and 3 by some
combination of the following steps.
1) Applying equivalences. As we have shown, some equivalences are derivable
from the identity and structural rules. Hence, we will at times replace occurrences of,
for example, ⌊F ⌋⊥ with ⌈F ⌉.
2) Incorporating structural rules into introduction rules. Although the for-
mulas StrL and StrR provide an elegant specification of the weakening and contraction
structural rules for the two difference senses for object-level formulas, they do not pro-
vide a good focusing behavior since the equivalences they imply can yield loops in a
specification. Therefore, we incorporate the structural rules into a theory by adding ?
and ! in its formulas. This transformation to a theory is usually formally justified using
an induction of the height of proofs.
3) Switching between multiplicative and additive introduction rules.
Given the presence of ? and ! within the specification of inference rules and the linear
logic equivalences ?(A⊕B) ≡ ?A O ?B and !(A&B) ≡ !A⊗ !B it is possible to replace,
for example, the “additive” version of the rules (∧L), (∧R), (∨L), (∨R) in L with their
“multiplicative” version, namely with
⌈A ∧B⌉⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌈B⌉) ⌊A ∧B⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋ O ⌊B⌋)
⌊A ∨B⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌈B⌉) ⌈A ∨B⌉⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ O ⌊B⌋).
Formal justification of this step will also be done using an induction on the height of
proofs.
When we build L′ from L and the rules in Figure 3 based on these steps, it will be
a simple matter to prove that the new theory L′ proves exactly the same formulas as
the original theory. However, before we can formally say that a theory L′ describes a
proof system, we must assign polarity to the meta-level atomic formulas ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉.
Only then can we claim that the “macro-rules” that result from focusing on formulas
in that theory match exactly the inference rules of the corresponding encoded object-
logic proof system. This polarity assignment may differ between different proof system
encodings. There are four possible global polarity assignments: (1) both meta-level
atoms, ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉, as negative; (2) both meta-level atoms as positive; (3 and 4) one
meta-level atom as positive and the other as negative. When both (Id1) and (Id2) are
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Γ,A ⊃ B ⊢ A Γ,A ⊃ B,B ⊢ C
Γ,A ⊃ B ⊢ C
[⊃ L]
Γ,A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B
[⊃ R]
Γ,A1 ∧A2, Ai ⊢ C
Γ,A1 ∧A2 ⊢ C
[∧Li]
Γ ⊢ A, Γ ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A ∧B
[∧R]
Γ,A ∨B,A ⊢ C Γ,A ∨B,B ⊢ C
Γ,A ∨B ⊢ C
[∨L]
Γ ⊢ Ai
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2
[∨Ri]
Γ, ∀xA,A{t/x} ⊢ C
Γ, ∀xA ⊢ C
[∀L]
Γ ⊢ A{c/x}
Γ ⊢ ∀xA
[∀R]
Γ, ∃xA,A{c/x} ⊢ C
Γ, ∃xA ⊢ C
[∃L]
Γ ⊢ A{t/x}
Γ ⊢ ∃xA
[∃R]
Γ,A ⊢ C Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ C
[Cut]
Γ,A ⊢ A
[I]
Γ ⊢ t
[tR]
Fig. 4 The sequent calculus, LM, for minimal logic. Here, c is not free in Γ∪{C} and i ∈ {1, 2}.
Γ,⊥ ⊢ ·
[⊥L]
Γ ⊢ ·
Γ ⊢ C
[WR]
Fig. 5 The rules to add to LM to obtain the sequent calculus, LJ, for intuitionistic logic.
Γ,A⇒ B ⊢ A,∆ Γ,A⇒ B,B ⊢ ∆
Γ,A⇒ B ⊢ ∆
[⇒ L]
Γ,A ⊢ A⇒ B,B,∆
Γ ⊢ A⇒ B,∆
[⇒ R]
Γ,A1 ∧A2, Ai ⊢ ∆
Γ,A1 ∧A2 ⊢ ∆
[∧Li]
Γ ⊢ A ∧B,A,∆ Γ ⊢ A ∧B,B,∆
Γ ⊢ A ∧B,∆
[∧R]
Γ,A ∨B,A ⊢ ∆ Γ,A ∨B,B ⊢ ∆
Γ,A ∨B ⊢ ∆
[∨L]
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2, Ai,∆
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2,∆
[∨Ri]
Γ, ∀xA,A{t/x} ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∀xA ⊢ ∆
[∀L]
Γ ⊢ ∀xA,A{c/x},∆
Γ ⊢ ∀xA,∆
[∀R]
Γ, ∃xA,A{c/x} ⊢ ∆
Γ, ∃xA ⊢ ∆
[∃L]
Γ ⊢ ∃xA,A{t/x},∆
Γ ⊢ ∃xA,∆
[∃R]
Γ,A ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ A,∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[Cut]
Γ,A ⊢ A,∆
[I]
Γ ⊢ t,∆
[tR]
Γ,⊥ ⊢ ∆
[⊥L]
Fig. 6 The sequent calculus, LK, for classical logic. Here, c is not free in Γ∪{C} and i ∈ {1, 2}.
present, atoms of the form ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ can be identified as duals, in which case the first
and second (respectively, the third and fourth) options collapse.
Although we concentrate on obtaining encodings of proof systems at the highest
levels of adequacy, it is worth noticing that one might still be interested in theories that
are adequate only at the level of (complete) proofs. For example, following the Curry-
Howard isomorphism, functional programs are complete proofs and their execution
involve the removal of (some) cut rules from these proofs. In that domain, one may not
require adequacy at the level of (open) derivations.
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(⊃L) ⌊A ⊃ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (⊃R) ⌈A ⊃ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉)
(∧L) ⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ ⊕ ?⌊B⌋) (∧R) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉& ⌈B⌉)
(∨L) ⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋) (∨R) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊕ ⌈B⌉)
(∀L) ⌊∀B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ?⌊Bx⌋ (∀R) ⌈∀B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ∀x⌈Bx⌉
(∃L) ⌊∃B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ∀x?⌊Bx⌋ (∃R) ⌈∃B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌈Bx⌉
(tR) ⌈t⌉
⊥ ⊗⊤
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2′) ?⌊B⌋ ⊗ !⌈B⌉
Fig. 7 The theory Llm encodes the sequent calculus proof system LM.
(⊥L) ⌊⊥⌋
⊥ (WR) ⌈C⌉
⊥ ⊗⊥
Fig. 8 Adding these two clauses to Llm yields Llj, which is used to encode the sequent calculus
proof system LJ.
(⇒L) ⌊A⇒ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (⇒R) ⌈A⇒ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ?⌈B⌉)
(∧L) ⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ ⊕ ?⌊B⌋) (∧R) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉& ?⌈B⌉)
(∨L) ⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋) (∨R) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊕ ?⌈B⌉)
(∀L) ⌊∀B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ?⌊Bx⌋ (∀R) ⌈∀B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ∀x?⌈Bx⌉
(∃L) ⌊∃B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ∀x?⌊Bx⌋ (∃R) ⌈∃B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ?⌈Bx⌉
(⊥L) ⌊⊥⌋
⊥ (tR) ⌈t⌉
⊥ ⊗⊤
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2) ?⌊B⌋ ⊗ ?⌈B⌉
Fig. 9 The theory Llk encodes the sequent calculus proof system LK.
3 Sequent Calculus
Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively, contain three sequent calculi for minimal (LM), in-
tuitionistic (LJ), and classical logic (LK). A linear logic encoding for these systems is
given by the theories, Llm, Llj and Llk shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9. These sets differ
in the presence or absence of ? in front of ⌈·⌉, in the presence or absence of the formula
(⊥L), and in the formula encoding the left introduction for implication. In particular,
in the LM encoding, no structural rule is allowed for right-hand-side formulas; in the
LJ encoding, the right-hand-side formulas can be weakened; and in the LK encoding,
contraction is also allowed (using the exponential ?). The formula (⊥L) only appears
in the encodings of LJ and LK. In the theories for LM and LJ, the formulas encoding
the left introduction rule for implication and the formula Id2
′ contain a ! before a pos-
itive occurrence of ⌈·⌉ atom. As we shall see, these occurrences of ! are necessary for
preserving the invariant that in minimal and intuitionistic logics the right-hand-side of
sequents do not contain more than one formula.
A key ingredient in capturing object-level sequent calculus inferences in a focused
linear meta-logic is the assignment of negative polarity to all meta-level atomic formu-
las. To illustrate why focusing is relevant, consider the encoding of the left introduction
rule for ⊃: selecting this rule at the object-level corresponds to focusing on the for-
mula F = ∃A∃B[⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋)] (which is a member of Llm). The focused
derivation in Figure 10 is then forced once F is selected for the focus: for example,
the left-hand-side subproof must be an application of initial – nothing else will work
with the focusing discipline. Notice that this meta-level derivation directly encodes
the usual left introduction rule for ⊃: the object-level sequents Γ,A ⊃ B,B ⊢ C and
Γ,A ⊃ B ⊢ A yields Γ,A ⊃ B ⊢ C. Moreover, the ! enforces that in all branches there
is at most one ⌈·⌉ atom. Similarly, because all meta-level atoms are assigned with neg-
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⊢ K :⇓ ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥
[I2]
⊢ K : ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌈A⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K, ⌊B⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ?⌊B⌋
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ !⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ F
[2× ∃,⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[D2]
Fig. 10 Here, the formula A ⊃ B ∈ Γ and K denotes the set Llm, ⌊Γ ⌋.
ative polarity, the formulas Id1, Id2, and Id2
′ in the theories correspond to the identity
rules of the (object) sequent calculi. The following derivation, which introduces the
formula Id2
′, illustrates again the role of the bang to enforce that all branches contain
at most one ⌈·⌉ formula. Here, K is the set Llm ∪ ⌊Γ ⌋, where Γ is a set of object-logic
formulas.
⊢ K, ⌊A⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ?⌊A⌋
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K : ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : · ⇓ !⌈A⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ?⌊A⌋ ⊗ !⌈A⌉
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[D, ∃]
If we fix the polarity of all meta-level atoms to be negative, then focused proofs
using Llm, Llj, and Llk yield encodings of the object-level proofs in LM, LJ, and LK.
We use the judgments ⊢lm,⊢lj, and ⊢lk to denote provability in LM,LJ, and LK.
Proposition 2 Let Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {C} be a set of object-level formulas. Assume that all
meta-level atomic formulas are given a negative polarity. Then
1) Γ ⊢lm C if and only if ⊢llf Llm, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
2) Γ ⊢lj C if and only if ⊢llf Llj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
3) Γ ⊢lk ∆ if and only if ⊢llf Llk , ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈∆⌉ : · ⇑
Furthermore, adequacy for derivations also holds between the respective proof systems.
Proof First, one shows that focusing (deciding) on formulas within the linear logic
theories Llm, Llj, and Llk encodes exactly the corresponding sequent calculus inference
rule. In all cases, this correspondence is shown with steps similar to the one offered
above for the left-introduction of ⊃. Once this level of adequacy for the encoding is
established, the other results concerning the equivalences of provability follow imme-
diately. See also [Miller and Pimentel, 2002, Pimentel, 2001] for similar proofs related
to the encoding of sequent calculus proofs. ⊓⊔
If one removes the formula Id2 and Id2
′ from the sets Llm, Llj, and Llk , obtaining
the sets Lflm, L
f
lj, and L
f
lk , respectively, one can restrict the encoded proofs to cut
free (object-level) proofs, represented by the judgments ⊢flm for minimal logic, ⊢
f
lj for
intuitionistic logic, and ⊢flk for classical logic. The following proposition is an immediate
consequence of the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Let Γ ∪∆ ∪ {C} be a set of object-level formulas. Then
1) Γ ⊢flm C if and only if ⊢llf L
f
lm, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
2) Γ ⊢flj C if and only if ⊢llf L
f
lj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
3) Γ ⊢flk ∆ if and only if ⊢llf L
f
lk , ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈∆⌉ :⇑
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Furthermore, adequacy for derivations also holds between the respective proof systems.
Now that we have succeeded to find linear logic theories that encode the sequent
calculus inference rules for minimal, intuitionistic, and classical logics at our strongest
level of adequacy, we turn to showing how these theories are related back to the more
elementary and modular sets of formulas shown in Figures 2 and 3. The equivalences
that appear in the following three propositions are all at the most shallow level of
adequacy: the equivalence of provability.
Proposition 4 Let Γ and ∆ be sets of object logic formulas. Then
⊢ll L, Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Llk , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉.
Proof From the structural rules, StrL and StrR, we know that ⌊C⌋ ≡ ?⌊C⌋ and
⌈C⌉ ≡ ?⌈C⌉. Since the only difference between Llk and L ∪ {Id1, Id2} is that the
former has ? before positive occurrences of ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉, it is the case that Llk is a
consequence of L ∪ {Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR}, proving the “if” direction.
For the “only if” direction, we need to show that the structural rules are admissible.
We use focusing to help. In particular, we show that if ⊢llf L, Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR,F1 :
F2 ⇑ then ⊢llf Llk ,F1,F2 : · ⇑, where F1 and F2 are multisets of meta-level atoms
(of which all are given a negative polarity). This is proved by induction on the height
of focused proofs (the proof follows the same lines as in [Miller and Pimentel, 2004,
Proposition 4.2]). We show the inductive case for (⇒L): all the others cases are done
similarly. Thus, assume that our proof ends with a decide rule that selects an instance
of the (⇒L) formula from Figure 2. Thus, the proof ends with the following derivation,
where K = L, Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR,F1 and F2 = F
1
2 ∪F
2
2 (here, F1 and F2 are multisets
of atomic formulas).
⊢ K : · ⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥
[I2]
⊢ K : F12 , ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : F12 ,⇓ ⌈A⌉
[R ⇓, R ⇑]
⊢ K : F22 , ⌊B⌋ ⇑
⊢ K : F22 ⇓ ⌊B⌋
[R ⇓, R ⇑]
⊢ K : · ⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : F2 ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Thus, ⌊A⇒ B⌋ ∈ F1 and by the inductive hypothesis, we have proofs of the sequents
⊢ Llk ,F1 : F
1
2 , ⌈A⌉ ⇑ and ⊢ Llk ,F1 : F
2
2 , ⌊B⌋ ⇑. By Proposition 1, the sequents
⊢ K′, ⌈A⌉ : · ⇑ and ⊢ K′, ⌊B⌋ : · ⇑ are also provable, where K′ = Llk ,F1,F2. Thus, the
desired proof using the theory Llk but with focusing on the (⇒L) formula in Llk is
⊢ K′ : · ⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥
[I2]
⊢ K′, ⌈A⌉ : · ⇑
⊢ K′ : · ⇓ ?⌈A⌉
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K′, ⌊B⌋ : · ⇑
⊢ K′ : · ⇓ ?⌊B⌋
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K′ : · ⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K′ : · ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
The “only if” direction is a direct consequence of this intermediate result and the
focusing theorem. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. Then
1) ⊢ll LM , Id1, Id2
′, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Llm, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉.
2) ⊢ll LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Llj, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉.
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Proof In the “only if” direction, we proceed in the same fashion as in Proposition
4. We prove that, for say minimal logic, if ⊢ll LM , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,F1 : F2, ⌈C⌉ ⇑ then
⊢ll Llm,F1,F2 : ⌈C⌉ ⇑, where F1 ∪ F2 is a multiset of ⌊·⌋ meta-level atoms and C
is any object-logic formula. The main interesting case is when the proof of ⊢ K :
F2, ⌈C⌉ ⇑ starts by focusing on (⊃L), where K = LM , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,F1. There is only
one resulting focused derivation, due to the presence of the bang in (⊃L), and it has
two open premises of the form ⊢ K : F12 , ⌊B⌋, ⌈C⌉ ⇑ and ⊢ K : F
2
2 , ⌈A⌉ ⇑, in which case
the proof proceeds the same as in Proposition 4. ⊓⊔
Proposition 6 Let Γ ∪∆ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. Then
1) ⊢ll LM , Id1, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll L
f
lm, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
2) ⊢ll LJ , Id1, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll L
f
lj, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
3) ⊢ll L, Id1, StrL, StrR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉ if and only if ⊢ll L
f
lk , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉.
Proof This proposition is proved in a similar way as the Propositions 4 and 5. ⊓⊔
It is well known that for the sequent calculus systems LM, LJ, and LK the cut-
elimination theorem holds. A direct consequence is the admissibility of the Id2 rule
in the theories considered for these sequent calculus systems, as states the following
proposition.
Corollary 1 Let Γ ∪∆ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. Then
1) ⊢ll LM , Id1, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ iff ⊢ll LM , Id1, Id2
′, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
2) ⊢ll LJ , Id1, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ iff ⊢ll LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
3) ⊢ll L, Id1, StrL, StrR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉ iff ⊢ll L, Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉.
The proof of this corollary follows from the admissibility of the cut rule [Gentzen,
1969] and the encoding of the cut-free sequent calculus (Proposition 3). To see a setting
in which the admissibility of the cut can be shown by directly considering the linear
logic specification of inference rules, see [Miller and Pimentel, 2002, Pimentel and
Miller, 2005].
4 Natural Deduction
The proof system depicted in Figure 11 is the ∀, ∧, and ⊃ intuitionistic fragment of
the classical system in [Sieg and Byrnes, 1998], presenting natural deduction using a
sequent-style notation: sequents of the form Γ ⊢ C ↑ are obtained from the conclusion
by a derivation (reading bottom-up) where C is not the major premise of an elimination
rule; and sequents of the form Γ ⊢ C ↓ are obtained from the set of hypotheses by
a derivation (from top-down) where C is extracted from the major premise of an
elimination rule. These two types of derivations meet with either the match rule [M ]
or the switch rule [S]. These two types of sequents can be used to distinguish general
natural deduction proofs from normal form proofs [Prawitz, 1965]: normal proofs are
those in which the major premise of an elimination rule is not the conclusion of an
introduction rule. Within the proof system in Figure 11, such proofs are exactly those
that do not allow occurrences of the switch rule [S]. To the rules in Figure 11 we can
add the introduction and elimination rules for ∨ and ∃ given in Figure 12. In those
rules, occurrences of ↑(↓) denote either ↑ or ↓ with the proviso that all occurrences of
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Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B ↓ Γ ⊢ A ↑
Γ ⊢ B ↓
[⊃ E]
Γ,A ⊢ B ↑
Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B ↑
[⊃ I]
Γ ⊢ A ∧B ↓
Γ ⊢ A ↓
[∧E]
Γ ⊢ A ∧B ↓
Γ ⊢ B ↓
[∧E]
Γ ⊢ A ↑ Γ ⊢ B ↑
Γ ⊢ A ∧B ↑
[∧I]
Γ ⊢ ∀xA ↓
Γ ⊢ A{t/x} ↓
[∀E]
Γ ⊢ A{c/x} ↑
Γ ⊢ ∀xA ↑
[∀I]
Γ,A ⊢ A ↓
[I]
Γ ⊢ A ↓
Γ ⊢ A ↑
[M]
Γ ⊢ A ↑
Γ ⊢ A ↓
[S]
Γ ⊢ t ↑
[tI]
Γ ⊢ ⊥ ↓
Γ ⊢ C ↑
[⊥E]
Fig. 11 The rules for the ⊃, ∀, and ∧ fragment of intuitionistic natural deduction NJ.
Γ ⊢ A ∨B ↓ Γ,A ⊢ C ↑(↓) Γ,B ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∨E]
Γ ⊢ Ai ↑
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2 ↑
[∨I]
Γ ⊢ ∃xA ↓ Γ,A{c/x} ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∃E]
Γ ⊢ A{t/x} ↑
Γ ⊢ ∃xA ↑
[∃I]
Fig. 12 The rules for ∨ and ∃ for intuitionistic natural deduction. In [∨L], i ∈ {1, 2}.
(⊃E) ⌊A ⊃ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋) (⊃I) ⌈A ⊃ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉)
(∧E) ⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋ ⊕ ⌊B⌋) (∧I) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉& ⌈B⌉)
(∨E) !⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋) (∨I) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊕ ⌈B⌉)
(∀E) ⌊∀B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ⌊Bx⌋ (∀I) ⌈∀B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ∀x⌈Bx⌉
(∃E) !⌊∃B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ∀x?⌊Bx⌋ (∃I) ⌈∃B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌈Bx⌉
(⊥) ⌊⊥⌋⊥ (tI) ⌈t⌉
⊥ ⊗⊤
(⊥E) ⌈C⌉
⊥ ⊗⊥
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2) ⌊B⌋ ⊗ !⌈B⌉
Fig. 13 The specification Lnj for intuitionistic natural deduction.
↑(↓) in a given inference rule are resolved the same way. Characterizing normal form
proofs involving ∨ and ∃ is more involved to describe and we shall not consider such
normal forms here.
We write Γ ⊢nj C to indicate that the natural deduction sequent Γ ⊢ C ↑ has a
proof in NJ and write Γ ⊢nnj C to indicate that the natural deduction sequent Γ ⊢ C ↑
has a normal proof in NJ: in this latter case, we shall restrict the formulas in Γ ∪ {C}
to have no occurrences of ∨ and ∃.
The theory Lnj in Figure 13 encodes natural deduction for intuitionistic logic. The
formula StrL is incorporated in the theory by adding ? to some positive occurrences
of ⌊·⌋ atoms and, to maintain the invariant that there is always at most one formula
in the right-hand-side of sequents, we add ! to negative occurrences of ⌊·⌋⊥. The judg-
ment Γ ⊢ C ↑ is encoded as the meta-level sequent ⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ and the judgment
Γ ⊢ C ↓ is encoded as the sequent ⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊C⌋
⊥. In order for this encoding to be
adequate at the level of derivations, we simply change the polarity assignment from
what was used with sequent calculus: in particular, we assign atoms of the form ⌊·⌋
with positive polarity and atoms of the form ⌈·⌉ with negative polarity. This change
in polarity changes left-introduction rules (within the sequent calculus) to elimination
rules (within natural deduction). For example, the formula (⊃L) now encodes the im-
14
plication elimination rule as is illustrated by the following derivation (here, (⊃L) ∈ K):
⊢ K : ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥
[R ⇓, R ⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌈A⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊B⌋
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
The change in the assignment of polarity also causes the formula Id2
′, which behaved
like the cut rule in sequent calculus, to now behave like the switch rule, as illustrated
by the following derivation, where Id2
′ ∈ Σ.
⊢ Σ, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊C⌋
[I1]
⊢ Σ, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ Σ, ⌊Γ ⌋ :⇓ !⌈C⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ Σ, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊C⌋ ⊗ !⌈C⌉
[⊗]
⊢ Σ, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2, ∃]
These two examples can be developed for all inference rules in Figures 11 and 12
and for focusing on all formulas in Figure 13. (Most of the missing cases are included
in the Appendix to further illustrate how these encodings work.) As the last example
above suggests, we can capture normal natural deduction proofs if we remove instances
of Id2
′ from Lnj. More specifically, let L
f
nj be the set of formulas Lnj except that we
drop Id2
′ and the formulas encoding the introduction rules for ∨ and ∃. As a result, it
is an easy matter to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object-level formulas and assume that all ⌈·⌉
atomic formulas are given a negative polarity and that all ⌊·⌋ atomic formulas are
given a positive polarity. Then Γ ⊢nj C if and only if ⊢llf Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑. Also,
if the formulas in Γ ∪ {C} contain neither ∨ nor ∃, then Γ ⊢nnj C if and only if
⊢llf L
f
nj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑.
Now that we have adequately encoded natural deduction derivations via the theory
Lnj, we can show how some (known) meta-theory results of intuitionistic logic can be
achieved using these encodings. For example, we show in Proposition 8 below that
sequent calculus proofs and natural deduction proofs prove the same formulas. First,
the next two lemmas relate Lnj and L
f
nj with the formulas in Figure 2 and 3.
Lemma 1 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. Then
⊢ll LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Lnj, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉.
Proof The proof follows the same lines as the proof of the Proposition 4. The main
difference in the “if” direction is that we also use the equivalence ⌊C⌋⊥ ≡ !⌊C⌋⊥
obtained from the StrL.
In the “only if” direction, we first prove the following equivalence, by induction on
the height of the proof and by assigning negative polarity to all ⌈·⌉ atoms and positive
polarity to all ⌊·⌋ atoms:
⊢llf Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ if and only if ⊢llf Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
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The case for when StrL is focused on is the most interesting one. There are two cases.
The first case is when the resulting premises are of the form ⊢ Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊B⌋
⊥ ⇑
and ⊢ Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌊B⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑, for which case we can use a linear-logic cut rule
with cut formula ?⌊B⌋: one premise is provable due to the induction hypothesis, and
the other is provable also by the induction hypothesis, but by first introducing the ! in
the cut formula !⌊B⌋⊥, as illustrates the following derivation (the cut rule used here is
proved admissible in [Andreoli, 1992]):
⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌊B⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ ?⌊B⌋
[?]
⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊B⌋
⊥ ⇑
⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : · ⇓ !⌊B⌋
⊥
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : · ⇑ !⌊B⌋
⊥
[R ⇑, D]
⊢ Lnj, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[Cut]
The second case is when the premises are of the form ⊢ Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊B⌋
⊥, ⌈C⌉ ⇑ and
⊢ Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌊B⌋ : · ⇑. In this case, because the elimination rules permute over in-
troduction rules in natural deduction, we can assume that the proof of ⊢ Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ ⌋ :
⌊B⌋⊥, ⌈C⌉ ⇑ finishes with a derivation that focuses only on formulas encoding (natural
deduction) introduction rules and has premises of the form ⊢ Lnj, StrL, ⌊Γ
′⌋ : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇑.
Here, there must be no other linear formula in the context, otherwise this sequent is
not provable by applying only the encodings of (natural deduction) elimination rules,
as these derivations would always contain a premise with at least two linear formulas,
and hence one is never able to apply the initial rule. We then proceed as in the first
case, but with the difference that we postpone the introduction of the bang of the cut
formula, !⌊B⌋⊥, until when these premises are reached.
From the StrL formula we derive the equivalence ⌊C⌋
⊥ ≡ !⌊C⌋⊥, which allows us
to obtain the equivalent theory, L′nj, from Lnj by replacing all occurrences of !⌊C⌋
⊥ by
⌊C⌋⊥. Now, we show the following intermediate result by induction on the height of
proofs and using the same polarity assignment as before:
⊢llf L
′
nj, StrL,F1,F2 : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ iff ⊢llf LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,F1 : F2, ⌈C⌉ ⇑
where F1 and F2 are sets of ⌊·⌋ atoms and C an object-logic formula. This direction
follows immediately from this intermediate result and the focusing theorem. ⊓⊔
The proof of the following lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Let Γ ∪{C} be a set of object logic formulas that do not contain occurrences
of ∨ and ∃. Then ⊢ll LJ , Id1, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll L
f
nj, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉.
From Propositions 5 and 6, Lemmas 1 and 2, and Propositions 2, 3, and 7, we
obtain the following relative completeness result between LJ and NJ.
Proposition 8 If Γ ∪{C} be a set of object-level formulas, then Γ ⊢lj C if and only if
Γ ⊢nj C. Furthermore, if the formulas in Γ ∪{C} contain neither ∨ nor ∃ then Γ ⊢
f
lj C
if and only if Γ ⊢nnj C.
Treating negation (in particular, falsity) in natural deduction presentations of in-
tuitionistic and classical logics is not straightforward. We show in [Nigam and Miller,
2008b] that extra meta-logic formulas are needed to encode these systems. Since the
treatment of negation in natural deduction is not one about focusing in the meta-level,
we do not discuss this issue further here.
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Γ ⊢ [A ⊃ B] Γ ⊢ A Γ,B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ C
[⊃ GE]
Γ,A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B
[⊃ I]
Γ ⊢ [A ∧B] Γ,A,B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ C
[∧GE]
Γ ⊢ F Γ ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ F ∧G
[∧I]
Γ ⊢ [A ∨B] Γ,A ⊢ C Γ,B ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ C
[∨GE]
Γ ⊢ Ai
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2
[∨I]
Γ ⊢ [∀xA] Γ,A{t/x} ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ C
[∀GE]
Γ ⊢ A{c/x}
Γ ⊢ ∀xA
[∀I]
Γ ⊢ [∃xA] Γ,A{c/x} ⊢ C
Γ ⊢ C
[∃GE]
Γ ⊢ A{t/x}
Γ ⊢ ∃xA
[∃I]
Γ,A ⊢ A
[I]
Γ ⊢ t
[tI]
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ C
[⊥E]
Fig. 14 The rules for intuitionistic natural deduction system with generalized elimination
rules, GE. The major premises of elimination rules is marked with brackets.
(⊃E) !⌈A ⊃ B⌉ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (⊃I) ⌈A ⊃ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉)
(∧E) !⌈A ∧B⌉ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ?⌊B⌋) (∧I) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉& ⌈B⌉)
(∨E) !⌈A ∨B⌉ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋) (∨I) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊕ ⌈B⌉)
(∀E) !⌈∀B⌉ ⊗ ?⌊Bx⌋ (∀I) ⌈∀B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ∀x⌈Bx⌉
(∃E) !⌈∃B⌉ ⊗ ∀x?⌊Bx⌋ (∃I) ⌈∃B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌈Bx⌉
(⊥) ⌈⊥⌉ (tI) ⌈t⌉
⊥ ⊗⊤
(⊥E) ⌈C⌉
⊥ ⊗⊥
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥
Fig. 15 The specification Lge for intuitionistic natural deduction with generalized elimination
rules.
5 Natural Deduction with Generalized Elimination Rules
Schroeder-Heister [1984] considered a form of natural deduction where the indirect style
of elimination rules used for ∨ and ∃ (see Figure 12) were also applied to conjunction.
Von Plato [2001] used that style of elimination rule for all connectives. In Figure 14 we
present an additive version of a natural deduction system with generalized elimination
inspired by one found in [Negri and von Plato, 2001, page 167]. The bracketed formula
in an elimination rule is called themajor premise. To encode proofs in natural deduction
using generalized elimination, we use the theory Lge shown in Figure 15. Intuitively,
Lge is obtained from L by using the formula StrL to insert ! and ? connectives, and by
using the identity rules to replace the negated literals ⌊C⌋⊥ by the atoms ⌈C⌉.
In order to match focused proofs using Lge with the proofs in Figure 14, we assign
negative polarity to all ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ meta-level atomic formulas. For example, focusing
on the formula (⊃E) in Figure 15 yields the following derivation, where K = Lge ∪⌊Γ ⌋:
⊢ K : ⌈A ⊃ B⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌈A ⊃ B⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌈A⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K, ⌊B⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ?⌊B⌋
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ !⌈A ⊃ B⌉ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
We can repeat this computation for all formulas in Lge and, in the process, prove
the following proposition.
17
Proposition 9 Let Γ ∪{C} be a set of object-level formulas and assume that all meta-
level atomic formulas are given a negative polarity. The sequent Γ ⊢ C is provable in
GE if and only if ⊢ Lge , ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ is provable in LLF. Furthermore, adequacy for
derivations also holds between the respective proof systems.
Given this linear logic theory, which encodes natural deduction with generalized
elimination rules at our strongest level of adequacy, we turn to showing how Lge relates
back to the sets of formulas shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Proposition 10 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. If ⊢ll Lge , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
then ⊢ll LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉. Furthermore, if ⊢ll LJ , Id1, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ then
⊢ll Lge , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉.
Proof The second statement is proved in the same lines as in the proof of Propo-
sition 4. For the first statement, we use a theory L′J , equivalent to LJ , that is ob-
tained by replacing literals of the form ⌊C⌋⊥ by the formula ⌊C⌋⊥ O ⊥, in the clauses
(∨L), (∧L), (⊃L), and (∀L) in LJ . Although ⌊C⌋
⊥ and ⌊C⌋⊥ O ⊥ are logically equiva-
lent, they have different focusing behaviors, as the latter has negative polarity regard-
less of the polarity given to ⌊C⌋. Now, we assign negative polarity to all meta-level
atoms and prove, by induction on the height of proofs, that if ⊢llf Lge ,F1,F2 : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
then ⊢llf L
′
J , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,F1 : F2, ⌈C⌉ ⇑, where F1 ∪ F2 is a multiset of ⌊·⌋ meta-
level atoms. In this proof, when necessary, we use the formulas Id2
′ and StrL in L
′
J to
obtain a derivation for a sequent of the form ⊢ L′J , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,F1 : F2, ⌊C⌋
⊥ ⇑ with
open premise of the form ⊢ L′J , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,F1,F2 : ⌈C⌉ ⇑. The statement follows
directly from this intermediate result and the focusing theorem. ⊓⊔
Notice that from the lemma above, Lge ’s expressiveness lies between a theory that
does not contain Id2
′ and that theory with Id2
′. From Corollary 1, however, we know
that the Id2
′ clause is admissible, so the following corollary holds.
Corollary 2 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. Then
⊢ll LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Lge , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
Although we obtain a theory that encodes GE with the strongest level of adequacy,
we find it odd that Lge does not relate so easily with other intuitionistic/minimal
theories, since we used cut-elimination in the object-logic to establish the formal con-
nection. We believe that the system as it is written does not pinpoint exactly where
the clause Id2
′ is needed. A similar problem happens in traditional presentations of
natural deductions that do not use annotated sequents and do not contain the [M ] and
[S] rules (Figure 11). The [S] rule allows a natural deduction proof to have the major
premise of an elimination rule be the conclusion of an introduction rule. Negri and
von Plato [2001] call such pairs of inference rules detour cuts and it is these pairs that
correspond to the cut rule in sequent calculus. We present a variant of GE, called GEA
(Figure 16), that makes these detour cuts apparent by using two types of annotated
sequents: Γ ⊢ C ↑ and Γ ⊢ C ↓. We denote by the judgment ⊢gea provability in GEA
(possibly containing the inference rule [S] and, hence, detour cuts) and we denote by
the judgment ⊢dgea, provability from GEA without the inference rule [S].
To encode GEA, we use the theory, Lgea, shown in Figure 17, and we assign negative
polarity to all ⌈·⌉ meta-level atoms and positive polarity to all ⌊·⌋ meta-level atoms.
As before with natural deduction, the sequents Γ ⊢ C ↑ and Γ ⊢ C ↓ are encoded
by meta-level sequents of the form ⊢ Lgea, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ and ⊢ Lgea, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊C⌋
⊥ ⇑,
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Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B ↓ Γ ⊢ A ↓ Γ,B ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[⊃ GE]
Γ,A ⊢ B ↑
Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B ↑
[⊃ I]
Γ ⊢ A ∧B ↓ Γ,A,B ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∧GE]
Γ ⊢ F ↑ Γ ⊢ G ↑
Γ ⊢ F ∧G ↑
[∧I]
Γ ⊢ A ∨B ↓ Γ,A ⊢ C ↑(↓) Γ,B ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∨GE]
Γ ⊢ Ai ↑
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2 ↑
[∨I]
Γ ⊢ ∀xA ↓ Γ,A{t/x} ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∀GE]
Γ ⊢ A{c/x} ↑
Γ ⊢ ∀xA ↑
[∀I]
Γ ⊢ ∃xA ↓ Γ,A{c/x} ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∃GE]
Γ ⊢ A{t/x} ↑
Γ ⊢ ∃xA ↑
[∃I]
Γ,A ⊢ A ↓
[I]
Γ ⊢ A ↓
Γ ⊢ A ↑
[M]
Γ ⊢ A ↑
Γ ⊢ A ↓
[S]
Γ ⊢ t ↑
[tI]
Γ ⊢ ⊥ ↓
Γ ⊢ C ↑
[⊥E]
Fig. 16 The rules for the natural deduction with generalized elimination rules and with
annotated sequents, GEA.
(⊃E) !⌊A ⊃ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (⊃I) ⌈A ⊃ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉)
(∧E) !⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ?⌊B⌋) (∧I) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉& ⌈B⌉)
(∨E) !⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋) (∨I) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉ ⊕ ⌈B⌉)
(∀E) !⌊∀B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ?⌊Bx⌋ (∀I) ⌈∀B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ∀x⌈Bx⌉
(∃E) !⌊∃B⌋
⊥ ⊗ ∀x?⌊Bx⌋ (∃I) ⌈∃B⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌈Bx⌉
(⊥) ⌊⊥⌋⊥ (tI) ⌈t⌉
⊥ ⊗⊤
(⊥E) ⌈C⌉
⊥ ⊗⊥
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2) ⌊B⌋ ⊗ !⌈B⌉
Fig. 17 The specification Lgea for intuitionistic natural deduction with generalized elimination
rules.
respectively. Now, the formula (⊃E) in Lgea encodes the generalized elimination rule
for implication in GEA, as illustrated by the following derivation, where K = Lgea∪⌊Γ ⌋
and F is either ⌈C⌉ or ⌊C⌋⊥:
⊢ K : ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K : · ⇓ !⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : · ⇓ !⌈A⌉
[!, R ⇑]
⊢ K, ⌊B⌋ : F ⇑
⊢ K : F ⇓ ?⌊B⌋
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K : F ⇓ !⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : F ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
We can repeat this style computation of focused derivation for every formula of
Ldgea, thereby proving the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object-level formulas and let Ldgea = Lgea \
{Id2}. Assume that all ⌈·⌉ atomic formulas are given a negative polarity and that all
⌊·⌋ atomic formulas are given a positive polarity. Then
1) Γ ⊢gea C↑ iff ⊢llf Lgea, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ 2) Γ ⊢
d
gea C↑ iff ⊢llf L
d
gea, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
3) Γ ⊢dgea C↓ iff ⊢llf L
d
gea, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌊C⌋
⊥ ⇑ .
The following proposition can be proved similarly to the proof of the Lemma 1.
This proposition provides the more careful placement of the Id2
′ meta-level axiom that
motivated our introduction of the annotated proof system.
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Proposition 12 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas and let Ldgea = Lgea \
{Id2}. Then
1) ⊢ll LJ , Id1, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ iff ⊢ll L
d
gea, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
2) ⊢ll LJ , Id1, Id2
′, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈C⌉ iff ⊢ll Lgea, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉.
Negri and von Plato [2001] identify another type of cut, called permutation cuts,
which occurs whenever the major premise of an elimination rule is the conclusion of
another elimination rule. They also propose a different notion of normal proofs, called
general normal form, for proofs in natural deduction with generalized elimination rules
where both detour and permutation cuts do not appear. In particular, derivations in
general normal form are such that the major premise of elimination rules are assump-
tions. In other words, the major premises in the generalized elimination rules shown
in Figure 16, are discharged assumptions. We write Γ ⊢n C to denote that there is a
general normal form proof of C from assumptions Γ . In our framework, this amounts
to enforcing, by the use of polarity assignment to meta-level atoms, that the major
premises are present in the set of assumptions. We use the theory Lnge obtained from
Ldgea, by replacing formulas of the form !⌊C⌋
⊥ by ⌊C⌋⊥, and assign negative polarity
to all atoms of the form ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉, to encode general normal form proofs, represented
by the judgment ⊢n.
Proposition 13 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object-level formulas. Assume that all meta-
level atomic formulas are given a negative polarity. Then Γ ⊢n C if and only if
⊢llf L
n
ge , ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑. Furthermore, adequacy for derivations also holds between the re-
spective proof systems.
Proof Proof by structural induction on the height of derivations. ⊓⊔
Proposition 14 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of object logic formulas. Then
⊢ll LJ , Id1, StrL,WR, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉ if and only if ⊢ll L
n
ge , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈C⌉
Proof This proposition is proved in a similar way as Proposition 5. ⊓⊔
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Propositions 3, 6, 13, and 14.
Corollary 3 Let Γ ∪ {C} be a set of formulas. Then Γ ⊢n C if and only if Γ ⊢flj C.
6 Free Deduction
Parigot [1992] introduced the free deduction proof system for propositional classical
logic that employed both the generalized elimination rules of the previous section and
generalized introduction rules2. The inference rules for free deduction proof system are
given in Figure 18. In order to treat classical negation here, we introduce the negation
¬B directly here and do not treat it as an abbreviation for B ⇒⊥.
We use the theory Lfd in Figure 19 to encode free deduction. To obtain the strongest
level of adequacy, we assign negative polarity to all meta-level atoms. For example, the
2 Later and independently, Negri and von Plato also introduced generalized introduction
rules in [Negri and von Plato, 2001, p. 214].
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Γ ⊢ ∆,A⇒ B Γ ⊢ ∆,A Γ,B ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[⇒ GE]
Γ,A⇒ B ⊢ ∆ Γ,A ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[⇒ GI1]
Γ,A⇒ B ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆,B
Γ ⊢ ∆
[⇒ GI2]
Γ ⊢ ∆,A1 ∧A2 Γ,Ai ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[∧GEi]
Γ,A ∧B ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆,A Γ ⊢ ∆,B
Γ ⊢ ∆
[∧GI]
Γ ⊢ ∆,A ∨B Γ,A ⊢ ∆ Γ,B ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[∨GE]
Γ,A1 ∨A2 ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ ∆,Ai
Γ ⊢ ∆
[∨GIi]
Γ,A ⊢ ∆,A
[I]
Γ,¬A ⊢ ∆ Γ,A ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[¬GI1]
Γ ⊢ ∆,¬A Γ ⊢ ∆,A
Γ ⊢ ∆
[¬GI2]
Fig. 18 The rules for free deduction, FD.
(⇒E) ?⌈A⇒ B⌉ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (⇒I) ?⌊A⇒ B⌋ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ ⊕ ?⌈B⌉)
(∧E) ?⌈A ∧B⌉ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ ⊕ ?⌊B⌋) (∧I) ?⌊A ∧B⌋ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉& ?⌈B⌉)
(∨E) ?⌈A ∨B⌉ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋) (∨I) ?⌊A ∨B⌋ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊕ ?⌈B⌉)
(¬GI1) ?⌊¬A⌋ ⊗ ?⌊A⌋ (¬GI2) ?⌈¬A⌉ ⊗ ?⌈A⌉
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥
Fig. 19 The specification Lfd for free deduction.
formula (¬GI2) encodes the inference rule [¬GI2], as is illustrated in the following
derivation, where K = Lfd ∪ ⌊Γ ⌋ ∪ ⌈∆⌉:
⊢ K, ⌈¬A⌉ :⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ?⌈¬A⌉
[R ⇑, ?]
⊢ K, ⌈A⌉ :⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ?⌈A⌉
[R ⇑, ?]
⊢ K :⇓ ?⌈¬A⌉ ⊗ ?⌈A⌉
[2×⊗]
⊢ K :⇑
[D2, ∃]
We can repeat this computation for all formulas in Lfd and, in the process, prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 15 Let Γ ∪∆ be a set of object-level formulas. Assume that all meta-level
atomic formulas are given a negative polarity. Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is provable in FD if and
only if ⊢ Lfd, ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈∆⌉ : · ⇑ is provable in LLF. Furthermore, adequacy for derivations
also holds between the respective proof systems.
In order to relate the theory Lfd back to other theories, we must first replace ¬
by “implies false.” We do this by using the operator φ inductively on propositional
formulas as follows: φ(FNG) = φ(F )Nφ(G); for all binary connectives N, φ(¬F ) =
φ(F ) ⇒ ⊥; and φ(A) = A if A is an atom. Moreover, φ(Γ ) = {φ(F ) | F ∈ Γ}, where
Γ is a multiset of formulas. We offer the following theorem as a means to related the
provable formulas of Lfd with those in other classical theories.
Proposition 16 Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a set of object logic, propositional classical formulas.
Then ⊢ll L, Id1, Id2, StrL, ?⌊φ(Γ )⌋, ?⌈φ(∆)⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Lfd, ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉.
Proof The “if” direction is proved in a similar way as Proposition 4 by using the
equivalences obtained from the structural and identity rules. The “only if” direction is
proved in a similar way as in Proposition 4, by assigning negative polarity to the meta-
level atoms. For the inductive case, however, when the clause Id2 is focused on, we
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use Parigot’s observation that any instance of a sequent calculus cut rule is translated
in Free Deduction to a sequence of elimination and introduction rules whose main
premises are the cut-formula. ⊓⊔
From Propositions 4 and 16, we have the following relationship between sequents
provable in free deduction and those provable in the LK sequent calculus.
Corollary 4 Let Γ and ∆ be sets of propositional, classical formulas. Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is
provable in FD if and only if φ(Γ ) ⊢ φ(∆) is provable in LK.
Parigot notes that if one of the premises of the generalized rules is “killed”, i.e., it
is always the conclusion of an initial rule, then one can obtain either sequent calculus
or natural deduction proofs with multiple conclusions. The “killing” of a premise is
accounted for in our framework by the use of polarities to enforce the presence of a
formula in the context of the sequent. Our encoding of the LK calculus could be ex-
plained by just such a focusing restriction. A presentation of a natural deduction with
multiple conclusions could be obtained in a similar way as for the natural deduction
with single conclusion but with the main difference being that one has to also incorpo-
rate the StrR rule in the theory by adding ? to positive occurrences of ⌈·⌉ atoms and
negative occurrences of ⌊·⌋ atoms.
7 The Tableaux Proof System KE
In the previous sections, we dealt with systems that contained rules with more premises
than the corresponding rules in sequent calculus or natural deduction. Now, we move
to the other direction and deal with systems that contain rules with fewer premises.
D’Agostino and Mondadori [1994] proposed the propositional tableaux system KE
displayed in Figure 20. Here, the only rule that has more than one premise is the cut
rule. In the original system, the cut inference rule appears with a side condition limiting
cuts to be analytical cuts: since that condition does not seem to be treated naturally
in our context, we consider only the unrestricted cut rule.
To encode KE, we use the theory Lke in Figure 21. To obtain an adequacy on the
level of derivations from Lke , we assign negative polarity to all atoms ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉. As
before, the negative occurrences of ⌈·⌉ and ⌊·⌋ enforce the presence of formulas in the
sequent, but now, Lke contains formulas with two negative occurrences of meta-level
atoms. These formulas encode the KE rules that contain only one premise. For exam-
ple, the clause (⇒L2) encodes KE’s inference rule [⇒L2], as illustrates the following
derivation, where K = Lke ∪ ⌊Γ,A⇒ B⌋ ∪ ⌈∆,B⌉:
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥
[I2]
⊢ K, ⌈A⌉ : · ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ?⌈A⌉
[R ⇓, ?]
⊢ K :⇓ ⌈B⌉⊥
[I2]
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : · ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
By checking all the other inference rules generated by focusing on formulas in Lke , we
can conclude with the following proposition.
Proposition 17 Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a set of object-level formulas. Assume that all meta-
level atomic formulas are given a negative polarity. Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is provable in KE iff
⊢ Lke , ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈∆⌉ :⇑ is provable in LLF.
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Γ,A,A⇒ B,B ⊢ ∆
Γ,A,A⇒ B ⊢ ∆
[⇒L1]
Γ,A⇒ B ⊢ A,B,∆
Γ,A⇒ B ⊢ B,∆
[⇒L2]
Γ,A ⊢ A⇒ B,B,∆
Γ ⊢ A⇒ B,∆
[⇒R]
Γ,A ∧B,A,B ⊢ ∆
Γ,A ∧B ⊢ ∆
[∧L]
Γ,A ⊢ A ∧B,B,∆
Γ,A ⊢ A ∧B,∆
[∧R1]
Γ,B ⊢ A ∧B,A,∆
Γ,B ⊢ A ∧B,∆
[∧R1]
Γ,A ∨B,B ⊢ A,∆
Γ,A ∨B ⊢ A,∆
[∨L1]
Γ,A ∨B,A ⊢ B,∆
Γ,A ∨B ⊢ B,∆
[∨L2]
Γ ⊢ A,B,A ∨B,∆
Γ ⊢ A ∨B,∆
[∨R]
Γ,¬A ⊢ A,∆
Γ,¬A ⊢ ∆
[¬L]
Γ,A ⊢ ¬A,∆
Γ ⊢ ¬A,∆
[¬R]
Γ,A ⊢ A,∆
[I]
Γ,A ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ A,∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[Cut]
Fig. 20 The rules for the classical propositional logic KE.
(⇒L1) ⌊A⇒ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋⊥ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (⇒R) ⌈A⇒ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ?⌈B⌉)
(⇒L2) ⌊A⇒ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥) (∧R1) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋⊥ ⊗ ?⌈B⌉)
(∧L) ⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ?⌊B⌋) (∧R2) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋⊥)
(∨L1) ⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉⊥ ⊗ ?⌊B⌋) (∨R) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (?⌈A⌉ O ?⌈B⌉)
(∨L2) ⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥)
(¬L) ⌊¬A⌋
⊥ ⊗ ⌈A⌉ (¬R) ⌈¬A⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌊A⌋
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2) ?⌊B⌋ ⊗ ?⌈B⌉
Fig. 21 The specification Lke for the system KE.
The following proposition is proved by induction on the height of proofs, by taking
into consideration the equivalences obtained by the identity and structural rules, and
by using the operator φ to replace ¬ in formulas by its “implies false” meaning.
Proposition 18 Let Γ ∪∆ be a set of object logic, classical, propositional formulas.
Then ⊢ll L, Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR, ?⌊φ(Γ )⌋, ?⌈φ(∆)⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Lke , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4. ⊓⊔
The following result, establishing the equivalence between KE and propositional
LK, is a direct consequence of Propositions 2, 4, 17 and 18.
Corollary 5 Let Γ and ∆ be a set of propositional formulas. Then Γ ⊢ ∆ is provable
in KE if and only if φ(Γ ) ⊢lk φ(∆) is provable in the propositional fragment of LK.
8 Smullyan’s Analytic Cut System
To illustrate how one can capture another extreme in proof systems, we consider
Smullyan’s proof system for analytic cut (AC) [Smullyan, 1968b], which is depicted
in Figure 22. Here, all rules except the cut rule have no premises. As the name of the
system suggests, Smullyan also assigned a side condition to the cut rule, allowing only
analytical cuts. As in the previous section, we shall drop this restriction as it is not
directly captured in our framework.
We again assign negative polarity to ⌊·⌋ and ⌈·⌉ atoms and use the theory Lac , shown
in Figure 23, to obtain the strongest level of adequacy. For example, the formula (⇒L)
corresponds to the inference rule ⇒L in AC, as illustrates the following derivation,
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Γ,A ∨B ⊢ A,B,∆
[∨L]
Γ,A ⊢ A ∨B,∆
[∨R1]
Γ,B ⊢ A ∨B,∆
[∨R2]
Γ,A ∧B ⊢ A,∆
[∧L1]
Γ,A ∧B ⊢ B,∆
[∧L2]
Γ,A,B ⊢ A ∧B,∆
[∧R]
Γ,A,A⇒ B ⊢ B,∆
[⇒L]
Γ ⊢ A,A⇒ B,∆
[⇒R1]
Γ,B ⊢ A⇒ B,∆
[⇒R2]
Γ,¬A,A ⊢ ∆
[¬L]
Γ ⊢ A,¬A,∆
[¬R]
Γ,A ⊢ ∆ Γ ⊢ A,∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
[Cut]
Γ,A ⊢ A,∆
[I]
Fig. 22 Smullyan’s Analytic Cut System for classical propositional logic, AC, except that the
cut rule is not restricted.
(⇒L) ⌊A⇒ B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥) (⇒R) ⌈A⇒ B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉⊥ ⊕ ⌊B⌋⊥)
(∧L) ⌊A ∧B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉⊥ ⊕ ⌈B⌉⊥) (∧R) ⌈A ∧B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌊B⌋⊥)
(∨L) ⌊A ∨B⌋
⊥ ⊗ (⌈A⌉⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥) (∨R) ⌈A ∨B⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋⊥ ⊕ ⌊B⌋⊥)
(¬L) ⌈¬A⌉
⊥ ⊗ ⌈A⌉⊥ (¬R) ⌊¬A⌋
⊥ ⊗ ⌊A⌋⊥
(Id1) ⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥ (Id2) ?⌊B⌋ ⊗ ?⌈B⌉
Fig. 23 The theory Lac used to encode Smullyan’s Analytic Cut System AC.
where K = Lac ∪ ⌊Γ ⌋ ∪ ⌈∆⌉ such that A⇒ B,A ∈ Γ and B ∈ ∆:
⊢ K : · ⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥
[I2]
⊢ K : · ⇓ ⌊A⌋⊥
[I2]
⊢ K : · ⇓ ⌈B⌉⊥
[I2]
⊢ K : · ⇓ ⌊A⇒ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌊A⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈B⌉⊥)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : · ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Again, the following proposition follows from repeating such constructions for all for-
mulas in Lac .
Proposition 19 Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a set of object-level, classical propositional formulas.
Assume that all meta-level atomic formulas are given a negative polarity. Then Γ ⊢ ∆
is provable in AC iff ⊢ Lac , ⌊Γ ⌋, ⌈∆⌉ :⇑ is provable in LLF. Furthermore, adequacy
for derivations also holds between the respective proof systems.
Again by using the equalities obtained from the identity and structural rules and
the operator φ, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 20 Let Γ ∪ ∆ be a set of object logic, classical propositional formulas.
Then ⊢ll L, Id1, Id2, StrL, StrR, ?⌊φ(Γ )⌋, ?⌈φ(∆)⌉ if and only if ⊢ll Lac , ?⌊Γ ⌋, ?⌈∆⌉.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. ⊓⊔
The following result follows directly from the Propositions 2, 4, 19, and 20.
Corollary 6 Let Γ and ∆ be a set of classical, propositional formulas. Then Γ ⊢ ∆
is provable in AC if and only if φ(Γ ) ⊢ φ(∆) is provable in the propositional fragment
of LK.
24
9 Some proof systems that cannot be encoded
Although we are able to encode a range of proof systems, there are many that do
not appear to be encodable using the framework we have described. For example,
non-commutative logics, such as [Lambek, 1958, Abrusci and Ruet, 1999], and proof
systems based on hypersequents [Avron, 1991] do not appear to be captured by direct
encodings into linear logic. Also, the inference rules for the “hybrid” conjunction
⊢ Θ,∆,A ⊢ Θ,Γ,B
⊢ Θ,∆, Γ,A ∧B
(mixing the multiplicative and additive treatments of contexts) analyzed by Hughes
[2005] does not seem possible to treat: here, additive and multiplicative behaviors are
strictly separated.
There is another set of examples for which the framework described here appears
to be inadequate but for which a natural extension to linear logic provides successful
encodings. The exponentials on linear logic are not canonical : that is, if we have a
red and a blue version of both ! and ? as well as two identical sets of inference rules
for them, then it is not possible to prove that these two connectives are equivalent.
(In contrast, all other connectives of linear logic are canonical.) Thus, linear logic can
be extended with many “non-canonical exponentials” and these additional connectives
do not need to have weakening and contraction associated to them: just weakening or
just contraction or neither can be part of their meaning. The authors in [Nigam and
Miller, 2009] used the term subexponentials to denote these non-canonical possibilities
and explored using them in algorithmic specifications. They can also play a useful role
in the proof specification framework that we describe here. For example, while we do
not believe it is possible to naturally encode object-level focused proof systems, such
as LJT and LJQ, or multi-conclusion proof systems for intuitionistic logic [Maehara,
1954] within linear logic, they can be encoded in versions of linear logic extended with
appropriate subexponentials (see Chapter 6 of [Nigam, 2009]).
10 Related Work
A number of logical frameworks have been proposed to represent proof systems. Many
of these frameworks, for example, [Felty and Miller, 1988, Harper et al., 1993, Pfenning,
1989], are based on intuitionistic (minimal) logic principles. A focused proof system for
intuitionistic logic that allows mixed polarization of atomic formulas was first presented
as the LJF proof system by Liang and Miller [2009]. Recently, Henriksen [2009] has
shown how it is possible to redo all the examples in this paper using LJF. Since most of
our relative completeness result followed using several classical dualities, such as ⌊B⌋ ≡
⌈B⌉⊥, such proofs in an intuitionistic fragment proceed along similar but different lines
from what is given here in our classical setting.
The abstract logic programming presentation of linear logic called Forum [Miller,
1996] has been used to specify sequent calculus proof systems in a style similar to
that used here. That presentation of linear logic was, however, also limited in that
negation was not a primitive connective and that all atomic formulas were assumed to
have negative polarity. The range of encodings contained in this paper are not directly
available using Forum.
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Ciabattoni et al. [2008] consider a general approach to the specification of structural
rules in sequent calculus which differs from our approach of specifying structural rules.
In particular, their method does not use the exponentials of linear logic, as we do in
the clauses StrL and StrR, but rather treats structural rules more explicitly by having
rules of the form
⌊B⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌊B⌋ O ⌊B⌋)
to encode the contraction-left rules (of the sequent calculus). It is worth noting that
while the StrR formula allows for both weakening and contraction on the right, there is
no corresponding modal operator in linear logic that allows for just weakening: hence,
we must also use the explicit weakening rule WR when we only want weakening. Using
the subexponentials that were mentioned in Section 9, it is possible to have exponential-
like operators that allow, for example, formulas to be weaken but not contracted. One
could imagine using such a subexponential, instead of the rule WR, to specify this
structural rules for intuitionistic logic.
11 Conclusions and Further Remarks
We have shown that by employing different focusing annotations and by using differ-
ent sets of formulas that are (meta-logically) equivalent to L, a range of sound and
(relatively) complete object-level proof systems can be encoded. We have illustrated
this principle by showing how linear logic focusing and logical equivalences can account
for object-level proof systems based on sequent calculus, natural deduction, general-
ized introduction and elimination rules, free deduction, the tableaux system KE, and
Smullyan’s AC proof system.
Logical frameworks aim at allowing proof systems to be specified using compact
and declarative specifications of inference rules. It now seems that a much broader
range of possible proof systems can be further specified by allowing flexible assignment
of polarity to meta-logical atoms (instead of making the usual assignment of some
fixed, global polarity assignment). A natural next step would be to see what insights
might be carried from this setting of linear-intuitionistic-classical logic to other, say,
intermediate or sub-structural logics.
All of the polarity assignments to atoms illustrated in this paper were determined
by their top-level predicate: that is, having ⌊·⌋ or ⌈·⌉ as their predicate determined
their polarity. One can image other styles of specification in which atoms such as ⌊B⌋
atoms were negative, say, when B is a disjunction or existential, and positive otherwise.
Such choices in polarization do not lose completeness and may yield interesting proof
systems.
Another interesting line of future research would be to consider differences in the
sizes of proofs in these different paradigms. As is known from logic programming,
changing polarities on atoms invokes different search regimes: in particular, negative
polarities for atoms yields a top-down, goal-directed proof search, whereas positive
polarities for atoms yields a bottom-up, program-directed proof search. Natural com-
putational trade-offs exists between these two choices: bottom-up proofs can be short
but hard to find while top-down proofs are often easier to find but can be exponentially
larger. It would seem interesting to transport some of these computational issues into
the more general setting of proof systems.
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12 Appendix: some inference rules and their linear logic encodings
We list below several examples of how natural deduction rules are accounted for by
focused deduction in linear logic. The following correspondences can be used to prove
Proposition 7. In the derivations below, K = L∪{StrL, Id1, Id2}∪⌊Γ ⌋ and all ⌈·⌉ given
negative polarity and all ⌊·⌋ are given positive polarity.
Γ,C ⊢ C ↓
[I]
!
⊢ K, ⌊C⌋ : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊C⌋
[I1]
⊢ K, ⌊C⌋ : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2]
Γ ⊢ C ↓
Γ ⊢ C ↑
[M]
!
⊢ K : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊C⌋⊥
[R⇓, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ⌈C⌉⊥
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ⌊C⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌈C⌉⊥
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[D2, ∃]
Γ ⊢ C ↑
Γ ⊢ C ↓
[S]
!
⊢ K : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊C⌋
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌈C⌉
[!, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊C⌋ ⊗ !⌈C⌉
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌊C⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2, ∃]
Γ ⊢ F ↑ Γ ⊢ G ↑
Γ ⊢ F ∧G ↑
[∧I]
!
⊢ K : ⌈F ∧G⌉ ⇓ ⌈F ∧G⌉⊥
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌈F ⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇑ ⌈F ⌉
[R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈G⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇑ ⌈G⌉
[R⇑]
⊢ K :⇓ ⌈F ⌉& ⌈G⌉
[R⇓,&]
⊢ K : ⌈F ∧G⌉ ⇓ ⌈F ∧G⌉⊥ ⊗ (⌈F ⌉& ⌈G⌉)
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈F ∧G⌉ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Γ ⊢ F ∧G ↓
Γ ⊢ F ↓
[∧E]
!
⊢ K : ⌊F ∧G⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊F ∧G⌋⊥
[R⇓, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌊F ⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊F ⌋
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌈F ⌉⊥ ⇓ ⌊F ∧G⌋⊥ ⊗ (⌊F ⌋ ⊕ ⌊G⌋)
[⊗,⊕l]
⊢ K : ⌊F ⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
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Γ ⊢ Ai ↑
Γ ⊢ A1 ∨A2 ↑
[∨I], i ∈ {1, 2}
!
⊢ K : ⌈A1 ∨A2⌉ ⇓ ⌈A1 ∨A2⌉
⊥
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌈Ai⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊A1⌋ ⊕ ⌈A2⌉
[⊕lr, R⇓, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈A1 ∨A2⌉ ⇓ ⌈A1 ∨A2⌉
⊥ ⊗ (⌊A1⌋ ⊕ ⌈A2⌉)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈A1 ∨A2⌉ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Γ ⊢ A ∨B ↓ Γ,A ⊢ C ↑(↓) Γ,A ⊢ C ↑(↓)
Γ ⊢ C ↑(↓)
[∨E]
!
⊢ K : ⌊A ∨B⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌊A ∨B⌋⊥
[!, R⇑]
⊢ K, ⌊A⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ ?⌊A⌋
[?]
⊢ K, ⌊B⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑ ?⌊B⌋
[?]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋
[R⇓,&]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ !⌊A ∨B⌋⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋& ?⌊B⌋)
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Notice that replacing ⌈C⌉ with ⌊C⌋⊥ in the above derivation yields the other proof
derivation.
Γ,A ⊢ B ↑
Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B ↑
[⊃ I]
!
⊢ K : ⌈A ⊃ B⌉ ⇓ ⌈A ⊃ B⌉⊥
[I1]
⊢ K, ⌊A⌋ : ⌈B⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇑ ?⌊A⌋, ⌈B⌉
[?, R ⇑]
⊢ K :⇓ ?⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉
[R⇓,O]
⊢ K : ⌈A ⊃ B⌉ ⇓ ⌈A ⊃ B⌉⊥ ⊗ (?⌊A⌋ O ⌈B⌉)
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈A ⊃ B⌉ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Γ ⊢ A ⊃ B ↓ Γ ⊢ A ↑
Γ ⊢ B ↓
[⊃ E]
!
⊢ K : ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥
[R⇓, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈A⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ !⌈A⌉
[!, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊B⌋
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊A ⊃ B⌋⊥ ⊗ (!⌈A⌉ ⊗ ⌊B⌋)
[2×⊗]
⊢ K : ⌊B⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2, 2× ∃]
Γ ⊢ t ↑
[tI]
!
⊢ K : ⌈t⌉ ⇓ ⌈t⌉⊥
[I1]
⊢ K :⇓ ⊤
[R⇓,⊤]
⊢ K : ⌈t⌉ ⇓ ⌈t⌉⊥ ⊗⊤
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈t⌉ ⇑
[D2]
Γ ⊢ ⊥ ↓
Γ ⊢ C ↑
[⊥E]
!
⊢ K, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ⌈C⌉⊥
[I1]
⊢ K, ⌊Γ ⌋ : · ⇑
⊢ K, ⌊Γ ⌋ :⇓ ⊥
[R⇓,⊥]
⊢ K, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇓ ⌈C⌉⊥ ⊗⊥
[⊗]
⊢ K, ⌊Γ ⌋ : ⌈C⌉ ⇑
[D2, ∃]
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Γ ⊢ A{c/x} ↑
Γ ⊢ ∀xA ↑
[∀I]
!
⊢ K : ⌈∀xA⌉ ⇓ ⌈∀xA⌉⊥
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌈A{c/x}⌉ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ∀x ⌈A⌉
[R⇓, ∀, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌈∀xA⌉ ⇓ ⌈∀xA⌉⊥ ⊗ ∀x ⌈A⌉
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌈∀xA⌉ ⇑
[D2, ∃]
Γ ⊢ ∀xA ↓
Γ ⊢ A{t/x} ↓
[∀E]
!
⊢ K : ⌊∀xA⌋⊥ ⇑
⊢ K :⇓ ⌊∀xA⌋⊥
[R⇓, ∀, R⇑]
⊢ K : ⌊A{t/x}⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊A{t/x}⌋
[I1]
⊢ K : ⌊A{t/x}⌋⊥ ⇓ ⌊∀xA⌋⊥ ⊗ ⌊A{t/x}⌋
[⊗]
⊢ K : ⌊A{t/x}⌋⊥ ⇑
[D2, ∃]
The pairing for the ∃I and ∃E rules are similar.
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